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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARION L. KESLER and GREGORY 
L. KESLER, a minor, by Marion : 
L. Kesler, : 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, : 
vs. 
WILLARD B. ROGERS, and 
ROCKEFELLER LAND AND 
LIVESTOCK COMPANY, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
and 
EDWARD B. ROGERS, et al. , 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF CASE 
Action by respondents, Marion L. Kesler 
and Gregory L. Kesler, for conversion of cattle 
and to set aside deed, assignments, bills of 
sale by Marion L. Kesler to Walter W. Kershaw 
of July 28, 19 69, and by Walter W. Kershaw to 
Rockefeller Land & Livestock Company of the 
Case No, 
13915 
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17th day of December, 1970, covering real and 
personal property. Counterclaim by appellant, 
Rockefeller Land & Livestock Company, to quiet 
title to the property. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court's judgment was that the 
appellant, Rockefeller Land & Livestock Company, 
had converted the cattle and the court set aside 
the conveyances, assignments, and bill of sale 
to Rockefeller Land & Livestock Company of the 
real and personal property including the cattle 
The court also gave judgment of $10,000 puni-
tive damages to respondent for the conversion 
of the cattle. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower 
court's judgment setting aside deeds, assign-
ments, and bills of sale of July 28, 1969, and 
December 17, 1970, and an order by the Supreme 
Court directing the lower court to enter judg-
ment quieting title in appellant to the propert 
involved in said deeds, assignments, and bills 
of sale. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1, Appellant's objections of the Parol 
Evidence Rule and the Statute of Frauds (Utah 
Code 25-5-1) 
The property involved consists of some 
314 acres of land in Millard County, Utah, 
cattle, water right, and grazing permit. This 
property is described in the deed, assignment, 
and bill of sale of July 28, 1969 (respondent, 
Kesler to Walter W. Kershaw) and deed, assign-
ment and bill of sale of December 17, 1970, 
(Kershaw to appellant, Rockefeller Land & Live-
stock Company), which transfers are hereinafter 
more specifically referred to. (Exhibits P-5 
and D-4). For convenience this property will 
be referred to as the "Property" unless speci-
fically designated otherwise. The deeds and 
assignments and bills of sale of July 28, 1969, 
and December 17, 1970, also included 480 acres 
of land, which land was the subject of another 
lawsuit in the District Court of Millard 
County by Ronald Bradshaw against appellant, 
Rockefeller Land & Livestock Company. That 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Utah, Case No. 13502. Hence it is not the sub-
ject of this lawsuit as hereinafter mentioned. 
The deeds, assignments and bills of sale 
relevant to this appeal are as follows: 
On July 28, 19 69, respondent, Kesler, by 
quit-claim deed, assignment, and bill of sale 
deeded and assigned the Property involved to 
Walter W. Kershaw (Exhibit P-5). The purchase 
price was fixed at $12,000 and as of July, 19 69, 
$2,800 of the price was paid by Kershaw. (R. 
31-32). 
On December 17, 1970, Kershaw, by quit-
claim deed, assignment, and bill of sale, 
deeded and assigned the Property involved to 
appellant, Rockefeller Land & Livestock Company 
The purchase price for the December 17, 1970, 
deed, assignment and bill of sale was $5,000, 
which was paid in escrow at the time of the 
closing of the December 17, 1970, transaction 
at the office of the Utah Title Company. (R. 
386, 485). 
For convenience, the transfers of the 
Property involved by deeds, assignments and Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
as the "transfer of July 28, 1969" or the 
"transfer of December 17, 1970," as the case 
may be. 
After the transfer of July 28, 1969, 
Kershaw gave an option to purchase 480 acres 
of the properties described in the transfer 
to one Ronald Bradshaw, In the district court 
action of Millard County mentioned above, 
Bradshaw v. Kershaw, the lower court ruled the 
option was valid and this court, case no. 
13502, 529 P 2d 803 (1974) affirmed that 
decision. Consequently, the 480 acres is not 
included as part of the property involved on 
appeal. 
Keslerfs ownership of the property which 
he conveyed to Kershaw in the transfer of 
July 28, 1969, was derived under an escrow 
contract between Grant D. Staples and Grace 
W. Staples, Sellers, and Ray A. Huber and 
Ina M. Huber, his wife, and Marion L. Kesler, 
and Carol Kesler, his wife, the Buyers, of 
March 1, 1966 (Exhibit P-3). In that 
transaction, warranty deed, assignment, and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Richfield State Bank as escrow agent to be 
delivered upon full payment of the purchase pi;ic 
provided in the escrow contract (R. 65-66) . 
Thus, clear title to the Property involved 
either by Kershaw (under the transfer of 
July 28, 1969) or by Rockefeller (under the 
transfer of December 17, 1970) was subject to 
payment of the balance due under the Staplesf 
escrow agreement of March 1, 1966. Kesler by 
assignments of Carol Kesler and the Hubers 
obtained all rights of the escrow contract at 
the time of the July 28, 1969 transfer to 
Kershaw. The papers for the transfer of 
July 28, 1969 (from Kesler to Kershaw) were 
professionally drawn by attorney Carvel 
Mattson, practicing attorney at Richfield, 
Utah, who, at the request of Kershaw and Kesler 
who provided Mattson with the descriptions 
and the information prepared such papers 
(R. 261-265) . 
The papers for the December 17, 1970 
transfer from Kershaw to Rockefeller Land & 
T.^ roqfnnV r.nmMnv were drawn bv the Utah Title 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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forms were used as were used in the transfer 
from Kesler to Kershaw of July 28, 1969, and 
the papers for the same were furnished to Utah 
Title Company by Carvel Mattson. Both the 
deeds, assignments, and bills of sale for the 
transfers of July 28, 1969, and December 17, 
1970, were clear, definite, and complete on 
their face without the slightest ambiguity. 
(Exhibits P-5, D-4) . 
The closing of the transfer of July 28, 
1969, (Kesler to Kershaw) was at attorney 
Carvel Mattsonfs office in Richfield, Utah. 
The closing of the transfer of December 17, 
19 70 (Kershaw to Rockefeller) was at Utah 
Title Company, Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 469-
473) . 
Kesler admitted that when he executed 
the July 28, 1969 transfer papers he knew 
that the papers contained the Properties 
involved in addition to the 4 80 acres in-
volved in the Bradshaw v. Kershaw action 
(R. 83-84). 
Kershaw admitted that when he executed 
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that the papers contained the property involved 
in addition to the said 480 acres. Indeed, 
prior to the execution of the documents, 
Edward Rogers (who was at the closing) had talke 
to Kershaw concerning certain letters by Carvel 
Mattson dated December 10, 1970, and November 11 
1970 (Exhibits D-5K, P-7). These letters 
indicated there might be some understanding 
for a buy-back or option by Kesler to purchase 
the Property involved. Kershaw had advised 
Rogers flatly that no such agreement existed 
and appeared insulted at such question 
(R. 485). 
Keslerfs testimony of an oral understanding 
with Kershaw for an option to buy back the 
Property is given credence by the testimony 
of Carvel Mattson. Mattson testified that 
when Kesler gave instructions to draw the 
documents for the transfer of July 28, 1969, 
there was a discussion, although vague, as 
to Kesler having some option to get the 
Property (other than the 480 acres) if Kesler 
came UD with some money, but that no agree-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ment had been written or finalized on same. 
(R. 280-281). 
Also giving credence to Kesler's testimony 
are Mattson's letter to Kershaw of December 7, 
1970 (Exhibit D-5K) and his letter to Edward 
Rogers of November 11, 1970 (Exhibit P-7) 
respecting "some confusion" on such option or 
buy-back agreement. Edward Rogers who received 
the letter of November 11, 1970 and a copy of th 
letter of December 7, 19 70, talked to Mattson 
about the letters prior to the transfer of 
December 17, 1970 and was advised there was 
a rumor. He also talked to Kershaw before the 
December 17, 1970 closing and, as mentioned 
above, Kershaw advised that there was no buy-
back agreement and was insulted by the 
suggestion. 
The lower court overruled appellants1 
objections of the parol evidence rule and the 
statute of frauds and ruled that the December 17 
1970 transfer of the properties from Kershaw 
to Rockefeller was invalid. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
POINT 
I. THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING AND ACCEPTING 
PAROL TESTIMONY TO SET ASIDE THE WRITTEN 
TRANSFERS OF KESLER OF JULY 28, 1969, AND 
KERSHAW TO ROCKEFELLER OF DECEMBER 17, 1970 
Appellant Rockefeller invoked the parol 
evidence rule and the Utah statute of frauds 
(Utah Code 25-5-1) at every stage in the 
evidence and the proceedings. As stated by 
Keslerfs attorney, such objections were "laid 
out on the record like a slab of cement" 
(R. 187). The lower court stated that "the 
character of the instrument is determined by 
the intentions of the parties" and if they 
were intended as a security agreement that is 
binding on all the world" (R. 108-109). The 
lower court in denying appellantfs motion to 
strike Kesler's testimony on the parol evi-
dence rule and the statute of frauds stated 
that as both parties to the transfer of 
July 28, 1969 (Kesler to Kershaw) intended it Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the pleadings admitted (as far as Kershaw and 
Kesler were concerned) that it was a security 
agreement, the court would have to hold this 
was the case and whether or not Rockefeller 
was bound depended on whether he took the 
property without notice of Kershaw and Kesler's 
intentions (R. 151-161). 
We challenge the court's rulings overruling 
appellant's objections of the parol evidence 
rule and the statute of frauds. 
We submit that the parol evidence rule and 
the statute of frauds can be invoked by anyone 
down the chain of title. That it is even more 
important that the last grantee in the chain 
of title should be able to rely on these rules. 
Otherwise his title could be challenged by 
any previous grantor who cries at the last 
closing: "I had an oral agreement!" 
As to Kershaw and Kesler intending a 
"security agreement"— Security for what? 
Security presupposes some sort of debt or 
obligation for the property held as security. 
Kesler owed no monev or obliaation to Kershaw 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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that was to be secured by the properties con-
veyed. And, as pointed out above, Kershaw had 
no obligation to pay off the balance due under 
the Staples escrow agreement. By the transfers 
of July 28, 1969, and December 17, 1970, both 
transferees took the properties subject to the 
escrow agreement (Exhibits P-5, D-4). And 
Rockefeller in order to preserve the rights unde: 
the escrow contract made two payments under the 
escrow agreement amounting to approximately 
$6,600 after the transfer to Rockefeller 
(R. 386) . 
It was argued below that possession by 
Kesler gave notice although Kesler admitted 
that he had actually never possessed the farm. 
But even so—assume possession—knowledge of 
what? Possession only gives knowledge and 
makes the buyer subject to what rights the 
possessor may have. If it is a year's lease, 
the purchaser takes subject to that lease. If 
it is a prior deed, he takes subject to such 
prior deed. But Kesler had no rights whatso-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
understanding with Kershaw negated by the 
statute of frauds and the parol evidence rule. 
For the understanding with Kershaw (whatever 
it was) was never reduced to writing. 
Certainly it may be that Kesler had a 
cause of action against Kershaw relating to the 
July 28, 1969 transfer. Kesler filed claim 
in his complaint in the lower court against 
Kershaw. The basis of this complaint was 
never revealed, and for that reason the court 
dismissed the action against Kershaw. Kesler 
chose only to pursue Rockefeller. Certainly 
no possible cause of action (fraud, or whatever] 
was mentioned by Kershaw to Rogers, for Kesler 
never even told Rogers about the unwritten 
promise mentioned in Exhibits P-7 and D-5K 
(R. 64) . 
The lower court stated, "I think there 
are some things that haven't been revealed . . 
And I don't blame myself on dismissing Kershaw 
(R. 495). 
We submit that under the following authori« 
+• "1 £±C a n n o 1 1 a n f e I r-\Tr\ A ess* 4- A rw^ e? mr-i A /-s-v 4- Vi*-\ VN-> V < ^ 1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
should have been sustained and judgment entered 
in favor of appellant for all the properties 
covered by the December 17, 19 70 transfers. 
The reasoning and ruling of the lower 
court is not the law of this court, nor of any 
court of any jurisdiction that we have been 
able to find. 
The Statute of Frauds 
The only exception to Utah Code 25-5-1 
(applicable to this case) is Utah Code 25-5-2, 
when a trust arises by implication or operation 
of law. In such cases, there must be an 
intentional, false, or fraudulent purpose. 
There must be fraud or at least breach of con-
fidential relationship. There was no evidence 
showing fraud, or confidential relationship 
between defendants and the grantors in the 
1969 and 1970 conveyances. 
As stated in Peseret Centers, Inc. v. 
Glen Canyon, Inc. 11 Utah 2d 166, 35 P 286 
(1960): "Absent fraud, duress, mistake, or Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
or impeach his own deed." In the 1969 convey-
ances Kesler attempted to impeach his own deed. 
In the 1970 conveyances, Kershaw attempted to 
impeach his own deed. 
See also Briggs v. Hanks 16 Utah 2d 138, 
396 P 2d 871. 
The Parol Evidence Rule 
The Utah Supreme Court has emphatically 
and explicitly ruled: A written document com-
plete on its face, unambiguous in its terms, 
cannot be modified or set aside by parol 
evidence absent fraud, mistake or the like. 
Thus in Fox Film Corp. v. Ogden Theater Co. 
82 Utah 279, 17 P 2d 294 (1934) (applying the 
parol evidence rule) the court had before it 
written contracts between plaintiff (Fox Film) 
and defendant (Ogden Theater) under which 
plaintiff agreed to provide motion picture films 
for rental and license fee. The court below 
ruled against plaintiff by reason of parol 
evidence of agreements modifying the terms of Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
instant case) the competency of the parol 
evidence was challenged under the parol evi-
dence rule. The court reversed the lower court 
ruling: 
In the absence of fraud or mistake, the 
classical rule to the effect that parol 
evidence is not admissible to contradict, 
vary, add to, or subtract from the terms 
of a valid written instrument is generally 
applied in cases of this kind, 
(The court will notice that following this quo-
tation, there are exceptions to this, such as 
writings that do not purport to set forth the 
entire contract. None of the exceptions apply 
to the instant case.) 
As stated in Jewell v. Horner 12 Utah 2d 
328, 366 P.2d 594 (1961) pp. 333-334: 
With respect to the standard and quality 
of evidence required to establish an oral 
trust, this court in the case of Chambers 
v. Emery stated: 
"In such event the proof must be stronc 
clear, and convincing, such as to leave 
no doubt of the existence of the trust. 
Such a case is similar to one where it is 
attempted to convert a deed absolute into 
a mortgage, or where the reformation of 
a written instrument is sought on the groi 
of accident, mistake, or fraud. In all Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
plaintiff must fail unless it is clear, 
definite, unequivocal, and conclusive. 
Public policy, and the safety and security 
of titles to real estate demand this rule, 
because such evidence is offered to over-
come the strong presumption, arising from 
the terms and conditions of an instrument 
in writing, which is always the best 
evidence of title. If it were once estab-
lished that the effect of the terms of a 
written instrument could be avoided by a 
bare preponderance of parol evidence, the 
gates to perjury would soon be wide openT 
and no person could longer rest in the 
security of his title to property, however 
solemn might be the instrument on which 
it was founded. 
(Our emphasis) 
The authorities are uniform. As stated in 
32 C.J.S. "Evidence" Sec. 851, pp. 216, 
" . . . a different rule would greatly increase 
the temptation to commit perjury." 
POINT II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING 
JUDGMENT FOR $10,000 PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
AGAINST DEFENDANTS, WILLARD B. ROGERS 
AND ROCKEFELLER LAND & LIVESTOCK COMPANY. 
The record in this case does not support 
an award of punitive damages against the 
defendants, Willard B. Rogers and Rockefeller 
Land & Livestock Company, in the sum of Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the court to enter such a judgment as it did 
at Paragraph 6 of the Judgment (ff 149) , It 
was likewise error on the part of the court 
to instruct the jury on the matter of punitive 
damages as it did in Instruction No, 9, which 
instruction was given over the objection of 
the said defendants, (R. 514), 
Defendant, Rockefeller Land & Livestock 
Company, acting through Willard B. Rogers, took 
possession of the cattle in question in reliance 
upon written documents (deed, assignment and 
bill of sale with warranties) which, on their 
face, were absolute and unconditional. We 
submit that defendants, under the facts of 
this case, were entitled to rely thereon, and 
even if ultimately that reliance is held by the 
courts to be erroneous, we submit that it can-
not by its very nature be wilful and malicious. 
The defendants had every justification to 
assert what they have felt to be their rights 
under said documents. It is enough in view 
of the vicissitudes of life to assume the 
risk of "error" and its consequences without 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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assuming the added burden of "malice" in 
relying on the efficacy of unequivocal documents 
In a Memorandum Decision of Judge Maurice 
H. Harding, found in the record at page SS 172, 
the Judge made this observation: 
"This has been a difficult case partially 
because of the sharp conflict in the evi-
dence, but mostly by reason of the fact 
that the basic documents involved appear 
to be absolute transfers of title to 
property on their face, yet are claimed 
to be absolute only in part, and in part 
security transactions..." 
If the learned trial judge found the resolutioi 
of this matter difficult, then how can it be 
said that defendants, as laymen, and unlearned 
in the law, acted maliciously. As a matter of 
law, they could not have done so, could not 
knowingly, wilfully and maliciously have so 
acted. To have done so would be beyond their 
powers. 
It should also be noted that the cattle 
were not taken in secret or by deception, but 
rather as stated above under claim of right. 
Defendants sought and obtained the help of 
the Sheriff of Millard County, and the cattle Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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supervision of the sheriff and with the assist-
ance of third parties, (R, 378), This is 
undisputed, (The sheriff and said third par-
ties were originally joined in this action, 
but were dismissed from the action.) 
In the case of Calhoun v. Universal Credit, 
106 Ut 166, 146 Pac 2d 284 (1944), the court 
cites with approval the following language: 
"The party must know that the act is 
wrongful and must do it intentionally 
without just cause or excuse. If he 
acts in good faith and in the honest 
belief that his act is lawful, he is 
not liable for punitive damages even 
though he may be mistaken as to the 
legality of his act." (Page 175 Utah 
Reports), 
In the instant case, there is no testimony 
whatsoever from which the finder of facts 
could conclude that Willard B. Rogers knew 
that what he was doing was wrongful. Even 
if this court upholds the lower court on the 
matter of ownership, the most that could be 
said in that event would be that Willard B. 
Rogers was mistaken. Even carelessness or 
negligence won't support punitive damages. 
See Rugg v. Tolman, 39 Ut 295, 117 Pac 54 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(1911); Palombi v, D & C Builders, 22 Ut 2d 
297, 452 Pac 2d 325 (1969). 
The documents in question were drafted 
by attorney Carvel Mattson and he testified 
that he drafted them exactly as he was 
instructed to do (R. 265) , all of which was 
either directed by or concurred in by plaintiff 
Kesler. Mr. Mattson testified that there was 
some talk of a buy-back but that it was never 
finalized. We submit that it appears clear 
that no conditions or restrictions to the 
absolute nature of the documents in question 
were ever agreed upon. It should be noted, 
however, that if there was such a private 
or secret agreement, it was a secrecy 
directed or concurred in by plaintiff, and 
to now allow him to take advantage of that 
secrecy to impose punitive damages upon 
defendants is grossly unjust. In effect, 
Kesler is rewarded for his sub rosa dealings 
by being given a $10,000 bonus. If there 
were conditions or restrictions on the 
documents, why were they not incorporated in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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some other open declaration of or reservation 
of Keslerfs claimed rights? It must of 
necessity be that either there were none or 
the secrecy was sought in connection with 
some other transaction, such as Kesler's 
bankruptcy, perhaps (R. 67). In either case, 
Kesler is not entitled to punitive damages 
from such a situation brought about by his 
own lack of candor (to say the least). 
Furthermore, there is no special 
interrogatory which would support such a 
judgment for punitive damages. The special 
interrogatories which the court submitted to 
this jury dealing with the question of 
punitive damages was No. 11, which is as 
follows: 
11. If the answer to interrogatory 
6, 8 or 9 is "yes", was the con-
duct of the Defendant, Willard 
Rogers, willful or malicious? 
Answer 
(a) If the answer to interrogatory 
10 is "yes", are the Plaintiffs 
entitled to recover exemplary 
or punitive damages as against 
Willard Rogers? Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(b) If your answer to 11 (a) i s 
"yes\ state the amount of the 
exemplary or punitive damages 
that should be awarded. 
Answer _______ 
In t e r roga to ry No. 6 d e a l t with the t ak ing 
of r\itt k" in December of 1970. In t e r roga to ry 
No. 8 dea l t with the sa le of two cows and 
two ca1 \ms at the De1ta au r t ion on January 15, 
1^/1
 r dtil ! ii t.oi rogatory N*e c> d e a l t vvith th^ 
taking of c a t t l e a l l eged ly owned by Gregory 
Kes le r , a minor. 
submit triar ••>! .i -"rf • -ato*, 
wine!) defendant--"; ^Mooted ;\ , , ' <" ; „ vac 
rd..- . vi' * x ~ ' i : '- *J ^ -' « i 4 1 i - i - , ' » ' i f -T-^J: 
of p ' a n t i r f s H *
 tn e f fo r t v.;t n ">i i zed th-3 
jurv he be ] ievo ! l n t iJ tn^v io> id any 
ma. i *> ' * * h vw ' n - ' *- V\^M * • >n -hat 
they ccu'id awai~! j-nifc i,-^ iamages l^as-d aj-on 
d l ^* f !it-> transaction:"" ev .^-i Hio^qh defen-
dai i <, - J . <« '. i w i < »i i 
with i \ f s i i d t raiiiiact io,)S . For examr lr->: 
p l a i n t i f f at tempted t o show some bad condu-:'; 
on the p a r t of defendant Rogers in connection Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
testimony was in di rect cc:: flier on this 
matter, bi it tl lat trai is act) f •*.*> ' <\
 t { 
$500, and viewed at its worst, Rogers mly 
sought: to 1 lave said sum escrowed, and in fact 
it was Nevertheless, under the aforesaid 
instruction, the jury, if i\ could find some 
""Hid 1 i CK ' in tin; t ransaof imi, i •. authorized 
to award punitive damages far out of propor-
tion to that rather minor occurrence. 
Fur thermore , in torrogu t < u;y Mo • 1 0 does not 
call for a "yes" answer, and, therefore, 
woul d not support the answer given by the jury 
d n 1] (a) • 
Finally, even if puniti ve damages were 
recoverab] e in th is ac t:i oi I th.e sum. of 
$10,000 as awarded is grossly excessive. 
Plaintiffs improperly attempted to ri dicule 
defei idant Wi ] 1 ard B Rogers i i I 1 il IO eyes of 
the jury by making fun of his overweight 
condition i n an attempt to induce them to 
act against defendan t ii I passion rather than 
in reason* At page 42 3 of the record the 
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a 11 o r n e y, i s i i i t e r r < ) g a t i n g M i R o g e r s ; 
A. N o . I f!t:t an ar t::ii fici a] i i lsemi nat :i on 
technician, and I've passed the State test 
requirement, and I cai i tell whether a cow,:s 
pregnant or not. 
The nrean*ir»c/ test ir uha* 1 yvc of a 
i ---st' : ! > i • --'t, x,-5 x t ? 
, i -TLI-IV^ t^s » v^u micrht say. 
v.- Where v : insert ^ cur aiL «£. the - -? 
A. Re c t inn o f t 1 le c ow. 
Q. • rectum of the animal , is that true? 
A. Yes Do you want me to explain i t more? 
Q * H ow nil :icl i do yo u we I gl I , I 11: Ro ge r s ? 
A Oh, about two hundred and, 4 0 some odd 
pounds. 
Q. Did you weigh about the sam^ at : . i-
time? 
A , No, I thi nk I probab] y wei ghed about 
two hundred 10 pounds then. 
Q. Your arms were about as big around as they 
ar e i low? 
A. No f I don't think so. But if you want to 
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Y"u, if" V'HI want, for: a do] lar. 
THE COURT" That' ' s i t x >c ) 1 ow. 
THE WITNESS: If you go in, you 
deserve a do] ia i . 
THE COURT: Th.atfs too low. 
If the award of punitive damages is any 
indicati on, plaint iff was highly successful 
i n t h i s t a c t i c, 11 i s n e v e i: tih e ] e s s s ufa -
mitted that Mr. Rogers 1 weight should have 
n o 11 1 i n g wh a t s o e ve r to do w i th ti :i e out come 
of this case and. to make fun of his over-
weight condition in front of the jury .-
improper, a] thoi igl i apparent] y s. * --c. i•-. 
W e s u b m i t, however, that the Supreme Court 
should disallow any award of punitive 
damages founder! nr^ sin'h .i wc^ful Ly poor 
tactic. 
The compensator- m ; o ^ ^ t- *w*rded in 
th i s a c t ion is for 'i"' i .- , 3 2 0 p 1 u s 
interest at. six percent if - r *m December 24, 
19 70 { exi: 1 uc > 1 ve of ' * $ - . crow f rom 
the Delta auction), h< c. rit 11 lowed an Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
payments made b : '-her on t'* < S t a r l o s 
e s c r r * 'The cr\^~' -1. pa? '••"<-•. i'*-' 
j udgme r • t \V *: - I 4 ~{} o r de re d t h n t s a i el pay men t s 
be offset i^j;iin.;l He* punitive damages, but 
it Is obvious that those payments in any 
event should be offset against the compensa-
tory daniatjey, pj r ticul di .'i y i f\ !*••: defendants 
contend, no punitive damages are justified.) 
It, therefore, appears that the compensatory 
judgment awarded to the plai i ltd ff i s a net 
amount of approximately $15,09 8 (exclusive of 
Interest) , A:J 1 awa rd of $10 ,000 exemplary 
damages is c1ear1y disproportionate to the 
amount of compensatory damages and defendants 
ci te :1 i i sup]: • * l * ? ^  : : . Hv -nse of 
Wilson v. Oldroyd, . . 7 59 
(1954), in v.'ir, t S.e o* *r * ;J". owed exemplary 
danta«,|es , I nil . - , , ;v, ^ '^^ ^ ^ ' *' 
te n pe r cen t (10 % ) c. f I \, r e <^r P en s a to t y 
damages, 
The Supreme Court of Utah has con sis ten 1 ly 
held that any award of pi initive 'damages must 
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compensatory damages, and as stated In the 
case of WiIsoi i v. oldroydf supra: 
"There is no definite formula or basis 
upon which punitive damages can be 
computed. They have to fall within the 
limits of reason; fmust not be so dis-
proportionate to the injury and the 
actual damage as to plainly manifest thai 
they were the result of passion and 
prejudice and must be correlated with 
the other facts and circumstances shown 
in evidence including defendant's wealth." 
Wc i' u I fin i i f i i < 11 i !,ri f i<»i, i ! K • f at ? tf. a , 1 1 d 1 1 1 e I *:» v , 
in this case no punitive damages should be 
awar de d t o p 1 a 1 n t i f £ s a nd a f a 11 i4 ve n t s a l l 
reasoiiat) 111 miiui.s inns!, . jqief n hrit. ',"> i 11 , i M M I I S 
excessive, arbitrary and clearly the result 
of prejudice and passion and should not b<-< 
ii.l lowed to stand 
POINT1 in THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
T!IHJ In M i Cum I c iiitiiij I tj.'il f in j u d i c i a l 
error in two respects i n giving" Instruction 
No. 4 (aa-JJ 7) : 
{1) Li) i-i.iJ d instruction the Court stated 
to the jmy that plaintiffs simply had the 
burden of orovina -hb^ -h +-b*»v woro +-K^ ^T.T*—~ 
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of the property In questi on by "a preponder-
ance of the evidence" Tl i i 3 i s i lot tl le law. 
As was pointed out in the argument under 
Point; I si ipj : a, tl le 1 mrden c £ I »roof i s by 
"strong, clear, ai id convincing evidence" , 
'Jewell _v_. Ho'rner, supra. 
(2) The Court stated to the \ jiii: y in 
Instruction No. 4 that the defendants, Rogers 
and Rockefeller, had the burden of proving by 
a preponderance of tl ie evidence that at the 
time they claimed to have acquired the Kershaw 
interest: :i i I tl ie property. \ - K , < -. .;. ff .r-i :-r? 
or agents had any notice, ei tl ler actual or 
constructive, of the fact that Walter 
Kershaw acqui red oi il y a seen ri ty i nterest i I i 
the property, other than the 4 80 acres. 'ftie 
Court thereby erroneoi is] y i mposed the burden 
of pi oof :" f 3 ack of ki 10 wledge oi i tl ie 
defendants, whereas the burden of provinc 
kn owl edge 1 s , ui I de r IJt: ah ] aw, p ]! a ce d upon 
the plaintiff It was held i n Independent 
Oil and Gas Company W She!ton, 79 U 3 84, 6 P Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"Before the title of ""the Shell Oi 1 Company 
can be said to be burdened with the 
covenants contained in plaintiff's mort-
gager the plaintiff must establish the 
fact that the Shell Oil Company had either 
actual or constructive notice of plaintiff1! 
mortgage at or before the time title to 
the property vested in the Shell Oil 
Company." (Vtah Report s, p, 3 9 6.) 
Defendants took due exception to Instructioi 
No. *•"-.." :,<. -he aforesai d instruction 
wa s clear1y pre j udic ia1 to de fen dan t s. 
CONCLUSION 
\o te.icr?^ hereinabove set f' *-h 
the judgment ot thr 'over ro rf 'h-^ ild l^ 
re vers or!, -u.'i i ! *- t i + V * ° : ]>oi ^  
ques *: .. ; *<...* c *! .<i,- -. 
Rockefeller LKM-- .<• ; :\^ t^^ ;:v Company; the 
judgment for pun iti ve damages should be 
vacated and set aside at all events. In the 
alternate ve, the defendants should be awarded 
Datec: April ' ' 18" ' , ] 975 
Respectful ly submitted, 
WILLIAM H. HENDERSON 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
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Mailed two copJ es of the foregoing Brief 
to Robert S. Campbell,, Jr., and Philip C. 
Pugs1ey, a 11orney s for p ] a1n 11f f, at theIr 
address, 4 00 El Paso Gas Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, and two copies to GustIn 
and Gust :i n , attorneys for defendant, Walter 
W. Kershaw, at their address, 1610 Walker Bank 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and 
two copies to Walter W. Kershaw at his address, 
1034 Oak Hills Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
all postage prepai d, this' day of 
, J 9 75, 
A11orney~~for DeifenSants and Appellan-
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